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Distributional Effects of Means Testing Social Security:  
An Exploratory Analysis 
Abstract 
This paper examines the distributional implications of introducing additional means testing of 
Social Security benefits where proceeds are used to help balance Social Security’s finances. 
Benefits of the top quarter of households ranked according to the relevant measure of means are 
reduced using a modified version of the Social Security Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP). 
The replacement rate in the first bracket of the benefit formula, determining the Primary 
Insurance Amount (PIA), would be reduced from 90 percent to 40 percent of Average Indexed 
Monthly Earnings (AIME).  
Four measures of means are considered: total wealth; an annualized measure of AIME; the 
wealth value of pensions; and a measure of average indexed W2 earnings. The empirical 
analysis, based on data from the Health and Retirement Study, starts with a baseline benefit for 
each household, calculated as the product of the average benefit-tax ratio under the current 
system, multiplied by the taxes paid by the household.  
These means tests would reduce total household benefits by 7 to 9 percentage points, 
amounting to 15.4 to 16.4 percent of the benefits of affected workers at baseline. We find that the 
basis for means testing Social Security makes a substantial difference as to which households 
have their benefits reduced, and that different means tests may have different effects on the 
benefits of families in similar circumstance. We also find that the measure of means used to 
evaluate the effects of a means test makes a considerable difference as to how one would view 
the effects of the means test on the distribution of benefits. 
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I. Introduction  
Policymakers are again focusing on the question of how best to strengthen the 
finances of the Social Security system. Some are considering introducing new means 
tests as at least a partial solution to its long term financial imbalance.1 
1 For an introduction to means testing Social Security and its consequences, see American Academy of 
Actuaries (2012). 
To provide some perspective on new approaches to means testing, we develop a 
menu of options involving different definitions of means. We then use data from the 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to investigate the consequences of the various 
possible choices for the level and redistribution of Social Security benefits fostered by 
each approach.  
The elements of a means test include: the unit being subject to the means test 
(individual or household); the Social Security benefits that are being adjusted (own 
benefits for one or both spouses; spouse or survivor benefits); the measure of means 
(current earnings; lifetime covered earnings; total wealth; the value of pensions; and total 
income earned over the lifetime in all work, whether covered or not); once means are 
measured, the definition of “high means;” and the formula that is used to reduce the 
benefits of those unit’s that are judged to have “high means.” 
It seems logical that any scheme to redistribute “old age” Social Security benefits 
based on means should consider the total benefits paid to the household, where 
throughout this paper households may be composed of either one person or a married 
couple. In contrast, as explained below, under the current system, redistribution of 
benefits is determined at the level of the individual, and is modified by a “top up” for 
spouse and survivor benefits. Attempting to accomplish redistribution at the level of the 
                                                 
   
individual weakens the relation between benefits paid to a household and the total 
covered earnings of the two spouses in the household. The effect is to reduce the amount 
of redistribution among households with different levels of earnings.2
2 See Gustman and Steinmeier (2001); Liebman (2002); Coronado, Fullerton and Glass (2011); Coe, 
Karamcheva, Kopcke, and Munnell (2011); and Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai (2013). These studies 
show that although the Social Security benefit formula is designed to redistribute benefits toward 
individuals with low lifetime earnings, there is much less redistribution of benefits at the household level 
than at the individual level, i.e., from households with high lifetime covered earnings to households with 
low covered earnings. 
While the current system bases redistribution of benefits on a measure of lifetime 
covered earnings (Average Indexed Monthly Earnings, or AIME), current proposals 
would also consider other measures of means. In this paper, we consider means tests 
based on lifetime earnings (covered or total), total wealth, and pension wealth.3
3 It has been argued that pensions are unduly favored by the tax law, and recent proposals, e.g., by 
Representative Camp, would apply a means test to pension benefits. Any effort to use pensions as a 
measure of means would, of course, have an adverse effect on saving through pension plans. 
  
To limit the number of possible combinations of elements for designing a means 
test, in this paper we restrict the form of the means test. We employ a method for 
reducing benefits that Social Security already uses to reduce the benefits of individuals 
who worked in and earned a pension from uncovered employment. To be more specific, 
we use a version of the Social Security Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) to reduce 
benefits of households with high means.4
4 To mitigate what Congress considered to be an unwarranted redistribution in favor of double dippers, 
WEP reduces the very high replacement rate up to the first bend point in the Social Security benefit 
formula from 90 percent to as low as 40 percent. This adjustment essentially reduces Social Security 
benefits of a fully affected worker by roughly $5,000. Applied at the household level, it would lead to a 
reduction of annual Social Security benefits of up to $10,000 for a household judged as having high means. 
(For further discussion of WEP, see Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai, 2014.) 
 We also clearly delineate the population 
affected by the means test we analyze. In particular, we reduce the generosity coefficient 
                                                 
   
of the Social Security benefit formula only for the top quarter of households, as ranked by 
one of the four measures of means.5
5 We realize that by focusing on the top quarter group we will be introducing a notch. The advantage of our 
approach is that it highlights the relationship between the definition of means and the households affected 
by the means test. The next step in our research will be to introduce a gradual adjustment in the tax rate, 
bridging households falling on the border of the top quartile of households and reducing benefits more 
sharply for those with a higher level of means. 
By its very definition, means testing reinforces the redistributive goal of Social 
Security at the expense of the system’s ability to provide fair insurance.6
6 There has always been tension between two goals of Social Security. The first is to insure that covered 
workers will have adequate or minimum incomes after retirement. The second goal is to redistribute 
benefits progressively (Myers, 1993), providing a disproportionately higher replacement rate the lower an 
individual’s covered earnings, as well as to provide benefits to spouses or survivors. On the one hand, if 
Social Security is an insurance program, there should be a close relation between the expected value of 
benefits and the history of taxes paid by individual units. On the other hand, redistribution requires that 
benefits exceed taxes paid for households designated as having lower means (that is, lower covered 
incomes), while benefits will then necessarily fall short of taxes paid for others with greater means. 
Provisions supporting both goals continue to operate, which means the system does not perfectly meet 
either goal.  
 In addition, if 
means testing is meant to solve some of Social Security’s financial problems, and as a 
consequence it reduces the pool of benefits available to all covered workers, means 
testing may reduce the ability of Social Security to meet either of its goals, to provide fair 
insurance or to support older retirees with low lifetime incomes.7  
Data are readily available to the Social Security Administration to support some 
versions of means testing, but are not available for others. Social Security does not 
aggregate individuals into households until after retirement, and even then does not do so 
for all households.8
8 For further discussion, see (Compson, 2011, fn. 5). 
 Nor does the Social Security Administration currently solicit data 
either on wealth or, with the exception of public employees who were employed in 
uncovered jobs, on pensions. That is not to say that these data could not be collected. For 
example, wealth data are collected in determining student loans, and pension data could 
                                                 
 be made available by the Internal Revenue Service. Other data would be more difficult to 
obtain. For example, it would be very difficult to measure and adjudicate a policy based 
on potential household earnings if husbands and wives worked full-time, a measure of 
means that some view as the fairest basis for redistributing benefits, one that does not 
penalize households based on their work.  
Before proceeding with our analysis, we should say something about approaches 
to means testing that we do not analyze in this paper. We do not consider basing a means 
test on current income, although that might seem to be a natural approach, and one that 
has been suggested by some policymakers. A major part of the current income of those in 
the population who have already claimed Social Security benefits is their current earnings 
(See Social Security Administration, 2014). Many forms of current income are easy to 
measure. But reducing benefits of those with highest current earnings would fly in the 
face of decades of policy initiatives that were designed to encourage older persons to 
delay the age of retirement.  
More specifically, in the face of the wave of baby boomer retirements, Congress 
adopted policies to reverse the adverse effects of earnings tests and other disincentives to 
postponing retirement. Yet any earnings test, even one applied only to high earners, is 
likely to encourage earlier retirement. Among a range of Social Security policies 
Congress has adopted, they have abolished the Social Security earnings test for those 
between the full retirement age and age 70; they have raised the full retirement age from 
65 to 67; and they have increased to 8 percent the delayed retirement credit, the actuarial 
adjustment for delayed claiming of benefits.9
9 Other legislation and/or court decisions encouraged delayed retirement by abolishing various forms of age 
discrimination. Thus together with the courts, Congress abolished mandatory retirement; required defined 
  
                                                 
 benefit pensions to adopt actuarially fair adjustments in benefits for those who delay retiring after age 65; 
and similarly required employers to continue to contribute to the defined contribution pension plans of 
those workers who were beyond the full retirement age specified by their plan. These policies have been 
shown to be effective in delaying retirement. See, for example, Anderson, Gustman, and Steinmeier (1999) 
and Gustman and Steinmeier (2009).  
If one wishes to analyze the disincentives that would be created by instituting a 
means test based on current earnings, there is a large literature to rely on.  All that is 
required is to modify the literature examining the effects on retirement of what previously 
were inadequate actuarial adjustments to the Social Security earnings test and other 
features of Social Security and pensions that penalized delayed claiming of benefits.  
We also do not consider proposals that would tax unearned income. That would 
seem to be an inferior approach to basing a means test on total wealth, which we do 
consider. A test based on unearned income may create distortions as wealth holders 
choose assets with returns that are not included in the means test (e.g., implicit returns to 
owner occupied housing; Piggott, 2014), adjust or time asset returns, or choose assets 
where the return takes the form of a capital gain that can be delayed until the asset is 
needed or bequeathed.  
Nor do we consider the potential of modifying the income tax to further means 
test Social Security benefits. Under current law, Social Security is subject to income tax 
if AGI is more than $25,000. For married couples filing jointly, the threshold is $44,000. 
Income taxes are paid on up to 85 percent of Social Security benefits.10
10 For couples filing jointly with incomes exceeding $44,000, the amount of benefits counted in income is 
the lesser of 85 percent of Social Security or the sum of $6,000 plus 85 percent of income over $44,000.  
For singles, it is the lesser of 85 percent of Social Security or the sum of $4,500 plus 85 percent of income 
over $34,000.  Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 2012, Table 2A31. 
 The vast majority 
of Social Security benefits of high-income individuals are already subject to the income 
tax. This leaves very little room for using the income tax per se as a basis for means 
testing Social Security benefits.  
                                                                                                                                                 
To be sure, there still will be adverse effects on incentives from the means tests 
we do consider. For example, a wealth test will affect the incentive to save; and a test 
based on lifetime earnings will favor those who choose to remain out of the labor force 
over those who commit to full-time work over their lifetime.  
Section II briefly describes how Social Security benefits are determined under the 
current system. Section III discusses the HRS data used in our analysis, and how those 
data can be used to measure the various concepts of means considered here. Section IV 
analyzes the distributional effects of the current system. In Section V we examine means 
tests based on total wealth, AIME, and pension wealth. Section VI explores heterogeneity 
among households affected by different means tests. Section VII concludes. 
II. The Current System  
Consider briefly the basics of Social Security benefit determination. Social 
Security benefits are based on a person’s highest 35 years of covered earnings. Covered 
earnings are measured by Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). Earnings are 
indexed up to the year the individual turns age 60. Earnings after age 60 are not indexed 
and are counted on a nominal basis. The basic benefit paid at full retirement age is called 
the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA). 
Five key features of Social Security affect the distribution of benefits and taxes.  
1. The benefit formula is progressive. It replaces a decreasing share of earnings 
as earnings increase. In 2014, the PIA replaced 90 percent of the first $9,792 
of indexed annual earnings; 32 percent of indexed earnings between $9,792 
and $59,004, and 15 percent of indexed earnings over that amount. (To 
 
facilitate later analysis, we specify earnings on an annual basis, although 
Social Security calculations are on a monthly basis.)  
2. Annual Social Security benefits also depend on when benefits are initially 
claimed. If the benefit is claimed before the full retirement age, it is reduced 
below the PIA. If claimed after the full retirement age, the annual benefit 
payment is increased above the PIA by the delayed retirement credit. 
3. If benefits are claimed before the full retirement age, and the individual earns 
income beyond an earnings disregard, benefits are reduced through an 
earnings test. (However, benefits lost to the earnings test are replaced in the 
form of higher benefit payments in the future.) 
4. Under dual entitlement, the total benefit paid to a spouse who is entitled both 
to benefits based on own covered work and to spouse benefits will be the 
higher of the two. Where spouse benefits (roughly half the benefit of the 
primary earner) are greater than benefits from own work, the spouse benefit 
“tops up” the benefit from own work and the recipient is called a dual 
beneficiary. Similarly, the total paid to a survivor is the greater of the benefit 
to be received as a survivor (the benefit of the primary earner) or the benefit 
based on the survivor’s own covered work. Again the survivor benefit is paid 
as a “top up” over own benefits.  
5. There is a cap on covered earnings. This cap determines maximum earnings 
subject to the Social Security payroll tax, and provides a maximum on the 
covered earnings in any one year that are counted in the calculation of AIME.  
 
III. The Data and Measures of Means 
Our analysis focuses on what the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) calls the 
Early Boomer cohort. Households are included in this cohort if they have at least one 
member who was age 51 to 56 in 2004. It is the latest cohort available to us that has 
matched Social Security earnings data. 
Among the advantages of HRS data: earnings histories are reported in both 
covered and uncovered jobs; data are collected at the household level and not just at the 
individual level; it is possible to estimate own, spouse and survivor benefits; information 
is collected on various forms of wealth, including detailed information on pensions; and 
the data indicate when an individual retires and claims benefits. 
Employment history, coverage by Social Security and pension coverage by job, 
plan type, and benefits are reported in the respondent interview. During the baseline 
survey in 2004, respondents are asked about their current job, last job if not currently 
employed, most recent previous job lasting five or more years, and two additional 
previous jobs lasting at least five years that offered a pension. Matched administrative 
records provided by The Social Security Administration report covered earnings in each 
year of work. 
For respondents who have not yet retired, we calculate own Social Security 
benefits from working on a covered job by applying the Social Security Administration’s 
ANYPIA (batch calculator) program to the covered earning records for the respondent. 
When earnings or benefit records are not available from the Social Security 
Administration, we impute them based on individual and job characteristics, including 
self-reported earnings.  
 
 Once the values of own benefits are calculated, the respondents are merged into 
households. Own, spouse, and survivor benefits are calculated at the household level and 
are summed to generate total household Social Security benefits. AIME, our measure of 
lifetime covered earnings, is also calculated at the household level. Benefits are 
discounted over the lifetime using expected interest rates and life tables from the Social 
Security Administration. 
Social Security is designed to be actuarially fair, paying a roughly similar benefit 
over the lifetime no matter what age an individual claims benefits.11
11 With the sharp decline the in the interest rate resulting from aggressive monetary policy aimed at 
inducing recovery from the Great Recession, there is a modest reward to delaying claiming after reaching 
the early entitlement age. (Shoven and Slavov, 2012). 
 Depending on when 
an individual retires, annual benefits may vary by up to 75 percent, e.g., between two 
individuals with identical covered earnings histories, one who claims benefits at age 62, 
and another with identical lifetime covered earnings who claims benefits at age 70.12
12 When conducting means tests based on wealth, we evaluate Social Security benefits as a stock. We do 
not consider a means test that is based on annual income and includes Social Security as part of annual 
income. A means test that is based partially on annual Social Security benefits would create a difference in 
lifetime benefits received, even when there is no difference in lifetime covered earnings (AIME), and thus 
no difference in the value of benefits that these covered workers are entitled to over their lifetimes. 
  
Respondents also report the balances from live defined contribution plans held on 
current or previous jobs. In the case of defined benefit pensions, respondents report 
expected or actual benefits and expected or actual ages of benefit claiming. 
In evaluating Social Security and pension benefits from reports of expected 
benefits, we use three different key dates: zero earnings are projected for all years after 
the date an individual leaves the labor force; for this date we use either the actual 
retirement date or the date when respondents in the self-reported retirement sequence say 
they expect to stop working (or 62 if that was missing, or 70 if the expectation was 
working past 70). For the expected date of claiming Social Security benefits, we use the 
                                                 
respondent’s self-report of when (s)he expects to receive Social Security benefits; again 
using 62 if missing and 70 for 70 and older. In evaluating pensions, we use the date when 
the individual reports expecting to begin claiming those benefits. Comparisons are then 
made on a present value basis. 
Covariation Among Different Measures of Means 
We would like to know whether it makes much difference which measure of 
means is used as the basis for the means test. A first question, then, is how closely related 
the different measures of means are to one another. We focus in Table 1 on the 
correlations among three measures of means, household total wealth, household AIME 
and household pension wealth. Below we consider the fourth, household W2 earnings.  
Before turning to the correlation coefficients, note that we expect them to be 
positive and relatively large. AIME determines Social Security benefits, and Social 
Security wealth is a major part of total wealth. Similarly, pension wealth is included in 
total wealth, and with a common component, a positive correlation is expected. But our 
interest is in determining whether these positive correlations are so large that it makes 
little difference which is chosen as the basis for a means test. 
Table 1: Correlation Coefficients Among Household Total Wealth, AIME, and 
Pension Wealth 
 Correlation Coefficients 
AIME and Total Wealth 0.795 
Total Wealth and Pension Wealth 0.701 
AIME and Pension Wealth 0.631 
 
   
Household AIME and total wealth are correlated .795, which suggests a number 
of households will be affected differently if the means test is based on AIME than if it is 
based on total wealth. This imperfect correlation is consistent with Venti and Wise (1999, 
2001) and Gustman and Steinmeier (1999), who found wide distributions of wealth when 
the population was divided into deciles according to lifetime incomes. More detail is 
provided in Appendix Table 1, which reports the counts of observations in each cell when 
wealth deciles are shown in the column heads and AIME deciles appear as row heads. 
Only 797 out of 2,439 observations fall along the main diagonal where they are in the 
same decile in both the wealth and AIME distribution.13
13 Including one cell to the right and left of each diagonal element, 1,633 observations are captured, which 
still leaves 806, or one third of the observations, falling well outside the diagonal. 
Total household wealth and pension wealth are correlated .701. This imperfect 
relationship is consistent with Gustman and Steinmeier (1999), who examined the 
substitution of pensions for other forms of saving and found the substitution between 
pension and other forms of total wealth was much less than perfect. Those with a pension 
exhibited higher overall wealth, income constant. But the difference in wealth between 
those with and without a pension was less than the value of the pension. These findings 
revealed considerable heterogeneity in the degree of substitution. Further detail is 
provided in Appendix Table 2, where total wealth and pension wealth are divided into 
deciles. Nine hundred and forty four of 2439 observations fall along the main diagonal.  
Analogously, the relation between household AIME and pension wealth is 
imperfect, with a correlation of 0.631. Appendix Table 3 shows the relation when AIME 
and pension wealth are divided by decile. 
                                                 
 As would be expected, there is an imperfect correspondence among households 
falling within the top three deciles when ranked by total wealth, AIME, or pension 
wealth. Consequently, some households whose Social Security benefits are reduced under 
one measure of means will not have their benefits affected should another measure be 
used as the standard for high means. The bottom line is that we can expect means tests 
based on AIME, total wealth, and pension wealth to affect many families differently. This 
will be apparent in our later findings. 
In addition to records on covered earnings, W2 records are also available. They 
provide information on covered and uncovered earnings dating back to 1980. Box 1 of 
the W2 record reports total earnings, while box 3 reports earnings covered by Social 
Security. Earnings from self-employment and earnings from employment not covered by 
Social Security (non-FICA earnings) are also reported.14
14 Self-employment earnings are not consistently reported over the full period. Before 1993, if a person had 
earnings as an employee, where the earnings were subject to the payroll tax, while also having self-
employment income, self-employment income was only reported until the sum of total earnings reached 
maximum covered earnings for determining Social Security payroll tax payments. Thus a person with a 
relatively well-paid job in covered employment who also worked in self-employment might not have the 
full self-employment income reported. Since employee earnings took precedence, for those with taxable 
earnings at the maximum, earnings from self-employment would vary inversely with the level of employee 
earnings. This problem was remedied in 1993 when the cap on earnings subject to the Medicare tax was 
abolished so that all self-employment earnings were reported. 
 We eliminate from our samples 
all households with earnings from uncovered work. The W2 records are still useful, 
however, in that they include earnings above maximum taxable earnings subject to the 
payroll tax. Because the W2 earnings are available only for later years of work, they will 
overstate average earnings over the lifecycle. Thus the W2 earnings are not meant to be a 
substitute for covered earnings, but a supplement to them providing an alternative way to 
rank households as to their means. 
 
                                                 
 Unfortunately, the W2 data are only available for a limited sample. More 
specifically, the W2 data are only reliably available from 1982 through 2008 depending 
on the years when permission was given for a match.15 
 15 The W2 data reported in the first years of the Earnings Records are subject to error. Viable records begin 
The oldest member of the Early 
Boomers would have been age 34 in 1982. The youngest member of the Early Boomer 
cohort was age 50 in 2003. Therefore, after indexing, we will average W2 earnings from 
ages 34 to 50 and use that average as a measure of lifetime earnings. The index we use is 
the measure of average wages used by the Social Security Administration to index 
earnings when calculating AIME.16
16 Given the limited number of years of W2 data available, many households do not have W2 earnings 
reported for all ages from ages 34 to 50. Many spouses who fall outside the Early Boomer age range are too 
old to have their earnings at age 34 included in the W2 records. Analogously, much younger spouses will 
not have observed W2 earnings at age 50. As a partial remedy, it is possible to use AIME records for those 
out-of-age-range individuals whose earnings never exceed the cap. 
  
For out-of-age-range individuals with earnings above maximum covered earnings, 
the missing W2 information will be important. Consequently, we calculate average W2 
earnings only for those households where both spouses were 34 to 50 in 2004, and where 
W2 earnings records are available for both spouses. We then compare findings using W2 
data for this smaller sample with the outcomes obtained for the reduced sample when we 
measure means by AIME, total wealth, or pension wealth.  
Correlation coefficients are reported in Table 2 for the reduced sample where the 
households have a matched W2 record, and W2 earnings are observable between ages 34 
and 50. With 655 households in the sample, AIME is correlated with total wealth 0.857.17
17 Within this restricted sample, when wealth and AIME are arrayed by decile, 224 of 655 observations, or 
34 percent of observations, fall along the main diagonal. This 0.857 correlation between AIME and total 
wealth in restricted sample compares with a correlation of .795 within the full sample of 2,439, with 797, or 
32.7 percent, of the observations falling along the main diagonal. 
 
Wealth is correlated with W2 earnings .812. From Appendix Table 4, we see that when 
                                                 
in 1982. 
 
W2 earnings and total wealth are arrayed by decile, 213 of 655 observations fall along the 
main diagonal.  
Table 2: Correlation of Coefficients Between Wealth, AIME, Pension Wealth, and 
W2 Earnings for the Households with 16 years of W2 Earnings Data 
 Total Wealth Pension Wealth W2 Earnings 
AIME 0.857 0.695 0.948 
Total Wealth  0.750 0.812 
Pension Wealth   0.689 
 
Table 2 provides an important piece of encouraging news. AIME on an 
annualized basis appears to be quite closely related to W2 earnings, at least within the 
limited sample for which W2 earnings are available. The correlation is .948. In Appendix 
Table 5, where AIME and W2 deciles are arrayed, 338 of 655 observations fall along the 
main diagonal, while 592 of 655 observations fall within one cell of the diagonal. This 
suggests that AIME will provide a useful indicator of lifetime earnings, even though 
earnings are only counted up to the cap. Note, however, that we have excluded anyone 
who had earnings from uncovered work, which has the effect of bringing these two 
measures closer together. 
Tables 3 through 5 illustrate the very different asset compositions within deciles 
when households are ranked by AIME, total wealth, and pension wealth. These tables 
report the values of the various components of wealth and the share of total wealth 
represented by those components within each specified decile. Next we would like to 
 
illustrate the differences in heterogeneity among households when different definitions of 
means are used. 
Table 3 divides households according to AIME decile. The positive relation 
between AIME and total wealth is apparent from the values for wealth reported in row 1. 
As AIME increases, the average value of total wealth rises from $83,000 in AIME decile 
1 to $1,442,000 for those households falling in the highest AIME decile. 
From the first column of Table 3, 42.9 percent ($36,000) of the total wealth of 
households in the lowest AIME decile is in the form of Social Security wealth. Nineteen 
thousand dollars, representing 22.6 percent of their total wealth, is in the form of 
pensions. Housing represents another 22.6 percent of their total wealth. Altogether, 
Social Security, pensions, and housing represent 89 percent of the total wealth of 
households in the lowest AIME decile, with other forms of financial and other wealth 
representing only 11 percent of total wealth. 
Looking over to the next to last column, those in the top AIME decile, with total 
wealth of $1,442,000, had $476,000, or 33 percent, of their total wealth in the form of 
Social Security. From row 3 of the next to last column, $431,000, or 29.9 percent, of their 
total wealth was in the form of pensions. Housing, worth $230,000, represented 16 
percent of their total wealth. Altogether, Social Security, pensions, and housing 
represented 79 percent of the total wealth of households in the top AIME decile, with 
slightly more than  one-fifth of total wealth represented by financial and other assets. 
Looking across row 2, although total wealth increases with household AIME, the 
share of total wealth represented by Social Security begins to decline, but only once the 
 
sixth AIME decile is reached. Moreover, that decline is not very steep. By the highest 
AIME decile, one-third of total wealth is still represented by Social Security. 
 
Table 3: Components of Wealth for All Age Eligible* Households in the Early Boomer Cohort by AIME Deciles (All values are 
in thousands of dollars)  
 
Deciles 
 
0-10 K 
 
10-19 
 
19-30 
 
30-39 
 
39-50 
 
50-62 
 
62-74 
 
74-86 
 
86-103 
 
103+ 
 
Total 
Total 
Wealth 
83 244 287 421 507 774 854 931 1,187 1,442 673 
Social 
Security 
 
36  
(42.9%) 
111 
(45.5%) 
162 
(56.4%) 
196 
(46.6%) 
262 
(51.7%) 
296 
(38.2%) 
345  
(40.4%) 
388 
(41.7%) 
410 
(34.5%) 
476 
(33.0%) 
268 
(39.8%) 
Pension 
 
 
19     
(22.6%) 
37      
(15.2%) 
34    
(11.8%) 
65   
(15.4%) 
87  
(17.2%) 
155 
(20.0%) 
213  
(24.9%) 
189 
(20.3%) 
283  
(23.8%) 
431  
(29.9%) 
151 
(22.4%) 
House 
 
 
19     
(22.6%) 
36      
(14.8%) 
44    
(15.3%) 
77    
(18.3%) 
75  
(14.8%) 
123  
(15.9%) 
130  
(15.2%) 
145  
(15.6%) 
196  
(16.5%) 
230 
(16.0%) 
107 
(15.9%) 
Other 
Assets** 
 
 
10      
(11.9%) 
61     
(24.9%) 
47     
(16.4%) 
84      
(20.0%) 
82      
(16.2%) 
200     
(25.8%) 
165    
(19.3%) 
209    
(22.4%) 
299    
(25.2%) 
305    
(21.2%) 
146 
(21.7%) 
Obs.*** 
 
288 263 260 248 255 243 236 225 215 206 2439 
*Age eligible households in 2004 include all families with at least one member being 51 to 56 years of age in 2004. Households with 
at least one member of the household being identified as a noncovered employee are excluded. 
** Other Assets include real estate, business, finance, vehicles, and IRA accounts. 
***The deciles are constructed using the household weights in 2004. The number of observations in the bottom row reports the 
number of unweighted households falling within each weighted decile.  
Table 4: Components of Wealth for All Age Eligible* Households in the Early Boomer Cohort by Wealth Deciles (All values 
are in thousands of dollars)  
Deciles 0-95 K 95-171 171-252 252-355 355-493 493-630 630-796 796-1078 1078-1510 1510+ Total 
Total 
Wealth 
41 131 209 305 419 561 706 930 1,269 2,156 673 
Social 
Security 
40  
(95.2%) 
118 
(90.1%) 
170 
(81.3%) 
223 
(73.1%) 
273 
(65.2%) 
323 
(57.5%) 
347  
(49.2%) 
383 
(41.1%) 
389 
(30.7%) 
414 
(19.2%) 
268 
(39.8%) 
Pension 1      
(2.4%) 
5      
(3.8%) 
20    
(9.6%) 
40   
(13.1%) 
68  
(16.2%) 
105 
(18.7%) 
150  
(21.2%) 
212  
(22.8%) 
362  
(28.5%) 
551  
(25.6%) 
151 
(22.4%) 
House 3      
(7.1%) 
6      
(4.6%) 
12    
(5.7%) 
25    
(8.2%) 
49  
(11.7%) 
80  
(14.2%) 
117  
(16.6%) 
157  
(16.9%) 
219  
(17.3%) 
405  
(18.8%) 
107 
(15.9%) 
Other 
Assets** 
-2             
(-4.8%) 
2      
(1.5%) 
7      
(3.3%) 
17     
(5.6%) 
29      
(6.9%) 
53     
(9.4%) 
93    
(13.2%) 
178    
(19.1%) 
299    
(23.6%) 
786  
(36.5%) 
146 
(21.7%) 
Obs.*** 282 258 250 254 260 238 231 231 231 204 2439 
*Age eligible households in 2004 include all families with at least one member being 51 to 56 years of age in 2004. Households with 
at least one member of the household being identified as a noncovered employee are excluded. 
** Other Assets include real estate, business, finance, vehicles, and IRA accounts. 
***The deciles are constructed using household weights in 2004. The number of observations in the bottom row reports the number of 
unweighted households falling within each weighted decile.  
 
Table 5: Components of Wealth for All Age Eligible* Households in the Early Boomer Cohort by Pension Wealth Deciles (All 
values are in thousands of dollars)  
Deciles 0 0 0 0-12 12-38 38-80 80-145 145-250 250-450 450+ Total 
Total 
Wealth 
  $308 K 436 489 629 751 819 1,056 1,646 673 
Social 
Security 
  166 
(53.9%) 
233 
(53.3%) 
257 
(52.7%) 
312 
(49.7%) 
331 
(44.0%) 
326 
(39.8%) 
349 
(33.0%) 
383 
(23.3%) 
268 
(39.8%) 
Pension   0     5      
(1.1%) 
23    
(4.7%) 
57    
(9.1%) 
111  
(14.8%) 
191  
(23.3%) 
336  
(31.8%) 
794  
(48.2%) 
151 
(22.4%) 
House   56    
(18.2%) 
84    
(19.2%) 
80  
(16.4%) 
115  
(18.3%) 
132  
(17.6%) 
138 
(16.8%) 
159  
(15.1%) 
201  
(12.2%) 
107 
(15.9%) 
Other 
Assets** 
  86      
(27.9%) 
115      
(26.3%) 
129     
(26.4%) 
144    
(22.9%) 
178    
(23.7%) 
164   
(20.0%) 
212   
(20.1%) 
268    
(16.3%) 
146 
(21.7%) 
Obs.*** 0 0 819 219 242 241 231 237 238 212 2439 
*Age eligible households in 2004 include all families with at least one member being 51 to 56 years of age in 2004. Households with 
at least one member of the household being identified as a noncovered employee are excluded. Households with top and bottom 1% of 
wealth are excluded. 
** Other Assets include real estate, business, finance, vehicles, and IRA accounts. 
***The deciles are constructed using household weights in 2004. The number of observations in the bottom row reports the number of 
unweighted households falling within each weighted decile.  
 
 
In contrast, we see from Table 4 that when household wealth is used as the 
measure of means, the share of total wealth due to Social Security falls from 95.2 percent 
of total wealth for members of the lowest wealth decile ($40,000, row 2, column 1) to 
19.2 percent of total wealth for those in the highest wealth decile ($414,000, row 2, 
column 10). To be sure, when total wealth is used as a measure of means, the present 
value of Social Security benefits received by households in the top wealth decile are ten 
times more valuable than Social Security wealth received by those in the bottom wealth 
decile. But total wealth in the top decile at $2,156,000 is 53 times as valuable as total 
wealth held by those in the lowest decile, at $41,000.  
If pension wealth were used to measure means as in Table 5, the bottom three 
deciles of pension holding households would have no pension wealth at all. Within the 
bottom three deciles, the present value of Social Security benefits represents 53.9 percent 
of total household wealth. Among the households falling within the highest decile of 
pension wealth, pensions represent 48.2 percent of total wealth, with Social Security 
accounting for 23.3 percent of total wealth.  
IV. Distribution of Benefits and Taxes Under Current Law 
To understand the redistribution of Social Security benefits that would be fostered 
by means testing, one must first understand how the current system redistributes benefits. 
We begin by ordering individuals, and then households, by the annualized value of their 
AIME (average indexed monthly earnings).  
Table 6 reports the distributions of the present values of benefits and taxes for 
individual respondents in the 2004 cohort of the Health and Retirement Study. Benefits 
reported in Table 6 include own benefits, and top ups for spouse and survivor benefits 
associated with the individual’s work. That is, top ups for spouse and survivor benefits 
are attributed to the individual who earned them, not to the spouses who are receiving 
them. 
In row 3, we define the present value of benefits redistributed to members of each 
AIME decile as the difference between (1) the benefits currently paid to members of the 
indicated decile, and (2) the benefits that would be paid to members of that decile if their 
benefits represented the same proportion of the taxes they paid over their worklife as 
found for the average individual in the entire sample. Note that those from the same 
household may fall in different AIME deciles when AIME is calculated at the level of the 
individual.  
As seen in row 3, with the exception of the first AIME decile, members of lower 
deciles have their benefits increased, while members of higher AIME deciles have their 
benefits reduced through the redistributive effect of the formula. For example, members 
of the fourth AIME decile have their benefits increased by 40 percent by the current 
redistribution scheme. Members of the tenth AIME decile have their benefits reduced by 
27 percent from what they would have been had they received the same benefit/tax ratio 
as the cohort as a whole, multiplied by the payroll taxes they paid. 
Row 4 divides the benefits redistributed to or from the members of the indicated 
decile by the total amount of benefits paid to members of this cohort. Looking at the last 
column, row 4, altogether individuals in the top three deciles arrayed by AIME have their 
benefits reduced by 10.53 percent of total Social Security benefits paid to members of 
this cohort. The benefits lost by those in the top AIME decile are redistributed to those 
with lower AIME levels.  
 
The bottom part of Table 6 indicates the real rate of return to taxes paid. The 
overall distribution of returns is shown in the last column of the table. Those falling in the 
ninetieth percentile of returns enjoy a 4.1 percent real return on their taxes. Those with 
the median rate of return enjoy a 1.7 percent real rate of return. No rate of return is 
reported for those in the tenth rate of return percentile. Those individuals will have paid 
taxes but not received any benefits. For the median respondents, those in the middle row 
of the bottom half of the table, the real rate of return to taxes paid falls from 4.1 percent 
for those in the second AIME decile to 0.1 percent for those in the top AIME decile.  
Table 7 does this same analysis just completed for individuals, but it does so at 
the level of the household. That is, the data in Table 7 reports the distribution of benefits 
and taxes when the lifetime covered earnings of individuals in the same household are 
aggregated, and the households are arrayed by AIME deciles. As can be seen from row 4, 
last column, when households are arrayed by AIME decile, the redistribution across 
deciles from high to low earning households amounts to 6.23 percent of total benefits. 
Compared to the baseline, under the current system households falling in the top three 
deciles of the AIME (lifetime covered earnings) distribution have 11.6 percent of their 
benefits redistributed to members of lower deciles. Households falling in the top three 
deciles when ranked by total wealth or pension wealth have their benefits reduced by 7.6 
and 10.7 percent respectively, representing 3.7 and 5.4 percent of total Social Security 
benefits paid respectively.  
 
Table 6: Baseline Measures of Distribution and Redistribution of Own Social Security Benefits and Taxes for All Age Eligible* 
Individual Respondents in the Early Boomer Cohort 
  
Annualized Individual AIME deciles: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
0-6 K 6-12 12-18 18-24 24-30 30-37 37-48 48-60 60-73 73+ All 
 
Average lifetime taxes 
 
$14 K 45 75 108 141 176 217 273 329 395 177 
Average lifetime benefits 
 
7 63 94 121 137 159 183 200 212 230 140 
% by which benefits are changed by 
redistribution 
-36% 78 58 40 22 14 6 -7 -19 -27 - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
the decile 
-0.29% 1.97 2.47 2.48 1.76 1.37 0.77 -1.15 -3.54 -5.84 10.53 
 
Real rate of return percentiles 
90% 
 
3.9 5.1 4.4 4.2 3.6 3.4 3.2 2.8 1.9 1.4 4.1 
75% 
 
- 4.7 4.1 3.8 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3 1.4 0.8 3.0 
50% 
 
- 4.1 3.3 2.9 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.6 0.7 0.1 1.7 
25% 
 
- 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.6 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.2 -0.4 0.3 
10% 
 
- - 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 0 -0.4 -0.8 - 
*Age eligible respondents in 2004 include all respondents who were between 51 to 56 years of age in 2004, or who had a 51 to 56 year old spouse in 2004. Households 
with at least one member identified as working in a job that is not covered by Social Security are excluded. Respondents from households with top and bottom 1% of 
wealth are excluded. 
** Benefits include own, spouse and survivor benefits associated with an individual’s work. Spouse and survivor benefits are attributed to the individual who earned 
them, not to the spouses who receive them. 
*** The amount of benefits redistributed to members of each AIME decile is defined as the difference between (1) benefits currently paid to members of the indicated 
decile, and (2) benefits that would be paid if their benefits represented the same proportion of the taxes they paid over their worklife as found for the average individual 
(or household) in the sample. 
 
Table 7: Measures of Distribution and Redistribution of Own Social Security Benefits and Taxes for All Age Eligible* Households in 
the Early Boomer Cohort  
  
Annualized Households AIME deciles: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
0-10 K 10-19 19-30 30-39 39-50 50-62 62-74 74-86 86-103 103+ All 
Average lifetime taxes 
 
$26 K 77 126 179 228 286 338 402 459 604 272 
Average lifetime benefits 
 
34 111 162 196 262 296 345 388 410 476 268 
% by which benefits are changed by 
redistribution 
39% 46 30 11 17 5 4 -2 -9 -20 - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
the decile 
 
0.38% 1.30 1.40 0.72 1.44 0.54 0.45 -0.30 -1.56 -4.37 6.23 
Real rate of return percentiles 
90% 
 
4.7 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.2 1.7 3.7 
75% 
 
3.9 4.1 3.5 2.9 2.9 2.4 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.3 2.7 
50% 
 
- 3.3 2.8 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.6 1.7 
25% 
 
- 1.8 1.8 1.0 1.3 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.5 
10% 
 
- 0.9 1.11 0.5 0.6 0.1 0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 
*Age eligible respondents in 2004 include all families with at least one member being between 51 to 56 years of age in 2004. Households with at least one member being 
identified as a noncovered employee are excluded. Households with top and bottom 1% of wealth are excluded. 
** We define the amount of benefits redistributed to members of each AIME decile as the difference between (1) the benefits currently paid to members of the indicated 
decile, and (2) the benefits that would be paid to members of that decile if their benefits represented the same proportion of the taxes they paid over their worklife as found 
for the average individual (or household) in the sample. 
 
 
 Again for those at the 50th percentile one sees a decline in the real rate of return 
as AIME increases. The real rate of return declines from 3.3 percent for households in the 
second AIME decile to 0.6 percent for those in the top AIME decile. Thus the fall in the 
real rate of return for the median household involves a decline of 2.7 percentage points 
from the second to tenth decile, while for the median individual it fell by 4 percentage 
points over a similar range. Clearly although there is a progressive benefit formula at the 
individual level, it is less successful in redistributing benefits among households than 
among individuals.18
18 In 1992, for respondents age 51 to 61, 10.6 percent of discounted benefits were redistributed among 
individuals, while 5.0 percent of benefits were redistributed among households (Gustman and Steinmeier, 
2001).  As noted above, for those ages 51 to 56 in 2004, 10.5 percent of benefits are redistributed at the 
individual level, while 6.2 percent of benefits are redistributed at the household level. In addition to the age 
differences between the samples, two other differences between the samples underlying these results should 
be noted. In the present paper, members of households falling within the top 1 percent of wealth holding 
households have been eliminated from the sample. In addition, households where at least one respondent 
has worked in a job not covered by Social Security have been eliminated. 
  
It is most meaningful to conduct the analysis of benefit redistribution at the level 
of the household rather than at the level of the individual. At the individual level, benefits 
are redistributed toward low-earning spouses from households where the primary earner 
has high-covered earnings. Conducting the analysis at the household level is also useful 
because wealth, one of the criteria we will use to categorize household means, is 
measured at the household level and is difficult to attribute to each spouse in married 
households. 
Table 8 summarizes the redistribution among households fostered by the current 
system under three different definitions of means: annualized AIME, representing 
lifetime covered earnings; total wealth; and pension wealth.  
If lifetime covered earnings is the relevant criterion, then the current system 
redistributes 6.23 percent of total discounted Social Security benefits from households 
                                                 
with high AIME (falling in the top three deciles) to households with low AIME. When 
households are ranked by total wealth, the current system redistributes 3.66 percent of 
total Social Security benefits from those falling in the highest wealth deciles to those 
falling in the lower wealth deciles. If pension wealth is the relevant criterion, the current 
system redistributes 5.36 percent of total Social Security benefits from those falling in the 
highest pension wealth deciles to those falling in the lowest deciles. 
Table 8: The Difference in the Share of Benefits Redistributed to Lower Deciles of 
Households by the Current System, by Basis for the Means Test  
Redistribution Among 
 
AIME Deciles 
 
Total Wealth Deciles 
 
Pension Wealth  Deciles 
 
6.23 
 
3.66 
 
5.36 
 
V. Means Tests Based on AIME, Total Wealth, and Pension Wealth    
The means test we use reduces the generosity coefficient up to the first bend point 
of the PIA formula from .9 to .4 for those falling in the top quarter of households ranked 
by whatever measure of means is being used. This approach allows us to greatly simplify 
our analysis by imposing the same penalty on a given household whether it is declared to 
fall in the top quarter of households because of its AIME, because of its total wealth, or 
because of pension wealth. As we will see, some households will be subject to the means 
test under one criterion but not others, some under two criteria, and some under three 
criteria. Given our specification of the means test, we will not have to further complicate 
 
the analysis by allowing the penalty for a given household to vary depending on the 
criteria used to determine who is subject to the means test.  
If the household is in the upper 25 percent by whatever measure, the reduction of 
the first bracket from 90 percent to 40 percent applies to the PIA calculations for both 
spouses. Spouse and survivor benefits are similarly adjusted. Because households include 
both single individuals and couples, and households in the top 25 percent include a 
disproportionate share of couples, couple households will be disproportionately subject to 
a means test that targets the top quarter of households. Moreover, the result of any means 
test at the household level will be affected not only by the number of one-person vs. two-
person households, but also by the relative number of one-earner vs. two-earner 
households. Within two-earner households, it will further depend on whether or not the 
lowearner in a two-earner household is receiving only a spouse benefit, in which case the 
benefit reduction for the household will be $5,000 + $2,500 dollars, or both spouses have 
earnings above the first AIME bend point, in which case the benefit reduction will be 
$5,000 + $5,000. In later work, it will be of interest to analyze the effects of separate 
means tests for one- and two-person households. Below we note that our findings are 
similar when we restrict the analysis to couple households. 
We now consider the reduction in the present value of benefits for those falling in 
the top three deciles relative to what they would have received in baseline. In the 
baseline, each household’s benefit is equal to the taxes they paid multiplied by the ratio 
of benefits to taxes for all households in the cohort. We subtract that figure from the 
benefit that is paid after the means test is introduced. We then express the benefit 
reduction relative to total benefits that are paid to members of the cohort in baseline.  
 
That is, benefit reductions as a share of total benefits paid are computed as:  
 
1. Si =  -    * /   /  
 
Where 
Si = the share of total benefits paid to all members of the cohort that is taken from 
members of the top three deciles 
i= indicator for the n households in a decile 
j = indicator for the N households in the complete cohort 
B = Benefits 
T = Taxes  
 
The benefit reductions are the result of two factors: the redistribution away from 
families under the current system as a result of the progressive benefit formula; and the 
particular means test that is applied.  
To put these means tests into perspective, when a means test based on AIME is 
imposed, average present values of benefits fall from 268 thousand to 245 thousand, an 
8.6 percent decrease in total benefits paid. Roughly this amounts to more than one-third 
of the benefit decline that would be required to keep the Social Security system solvent 
given the current tax structure.  
Tables 9 and 10 report the effects of alternative means tests. The percentage 
decline in benefits reported in Table 9 is the sum of redistribution under the current 
system from the baseline benefit plus the effect of the indicated means test. Table 10 nets 
out the redistribution under the current system and reports the additional redistribution 
from the indicated means test. 
In the row heads of Table 9, we list the alternative types of means that are used in 
the means tests. In the column heads we list the criteria for measuring the change in 
benefits for members of the top three deciles. Thus, for example, if a policymaker 
 
thought that wealth was the appropriate way to judge means, then looking down column 
2, this policymaker could judge the effects of adopting means tests based on AIME, 
wealth or pensions using a consistent criterion based on total wealth. Along the diagonal 
of Table 9, the basis of the means test and the criteria for ordering households and 
judging the reduction in benefits of those in the top three deciles of households coincide.  
The largest total reduction in benefits, relative to the baseline, occurs as a result 
of implementing a means test when means are defined as AIME and the means test is 
based on AIME. As seen in row 1, column 1, those in the top three deciles of households 
ranked by AIME have their benefits reduced from baseline by an amount equal to 14.84 
percent of total benefits paid to members of the cohort. This reduction is due to the 
combined effects of redistribution under the current system plus the reduction in the 
Social Security benefits of those falling in the top three deciles when ranked by AIME. 
From row 2, column 2, when the means test and the criteria for measuring redistribution 
are both based on total wealth, the decline in Social Security benefits for the top three 
deciles of households ranked by total wealth amounts to 11.01 percent of total benefits. 
When pensions are the basis for defining means and the means test is based on pension 
wealth, the present value of Social Security benefits of those falling in the top quarter of 
households ranked by pension wealth are reduced by 12.59 percent of total benefits.  
Remember, however, that these numbers refer to the present value of benefits 
taken from different sets of households, those with the highest AIME, the highest total 
wealth, and the highest pension wealth.  
When the evaluation is based on AIME, but the means test is based on wealth, as 
in row 2, column 1, the top 30 percent of households judged by AIME have their benefits 
 
reduced by a smaller amount (11.93% of total benefits paid to the cohort) than if the 
means test is based on AIME and the criterion is AIME (row 1, column 1) when benefits 
are reduced by 14.84%. For those policymakers who think that means testing should be 
based on lifetime covered earnings, basing the means test on wealth or pension wealth 
creates a means test that is less target efficient.  
Looking down column 2 where the means test is evaluated based on total wealth, 
more benefits will be taken from the top 30 percent of wealth holding households when 
the means test is based on AIME (11.52 percent of total benefits paid to the cohort) than 
when it is based on total wealth (11.01 percent). When the means test is evaluated based 
on pension wealth (column 3), there is little difference in the benefits lost by members of 
the top three deciles no matter what measure of means is used to implement the means 
test.  
Looking across the rows, one can ask how a particular means test will be 
evaluated when it is judged based on alternative criteria. For example, looking across row 
1, the combined effects of redistribution under the current system plus a means test based 
on AIME is judged to reduce benefits of the top 30 percent of households when ordered 
based on AIME (14.84%) by more than when households are ordered based on total 
wealth (11.52%) or pension wealth (12.51%).  
To report the effects of means testing alone, the numbers reported in Table 10 
subtract the effects of redistribution under the current system from the total effect of 
redistribution and the means test combined, as reported in Table 9. Once again, the funds 
raised by the means test alone are used to pay off the Social Security deficit, rather than 
to raise the benefits of those lower down in the means distribution.  
 
From Table 10, we see that if one feels that AIME is the proper basis for a means 
test, designing the means test based on AIME will raise about three percentage points 
more revenue from those in the top three deciles (8.61%) than will tests based on total 
wealth (5.70%) or pension wealth (5.40%). If one believes that total wealth or pension 
wealth is the appropriate basis for a means test, then whatever basis is chosen for the 
means test, the reduction in benefits from those in the top three deciles will be similar.  
 
Table 9: Percent Reduction in Benefits from Baseline by Basis for Means Test and 
the Measure of Means Used to Evaluate the Impact  
 
Basis for Social Security Means 
Test 
Measure of Means Used to Evaluate Impact 
 
AIME  Deciles 
 
Wealth  Deciles 
 
Pension Wealth  
Deciles 
 
Adjusted by Top Quarter of 
AIME 
 
14.84 
 
11.52 
 
12.51 
 
Adjusted by Top Quarter of 
Wealth 
 
11.93 
 
11.01 
 
11.38 
 
Adjusted by Top Quarter of 
Pension Wealth 
 
11.63 
 
10.49 
 
12.59 
*Baseline of benefits is defined as the product of the ratio of benefits to taxes for the 
entire cohort multiplied by taxes paid by the household. 
 
 
Table 10: Share of Total Benefits Produced by Means Test Used to Reduced 
Social Security Deficit 
 
Basis for Social Security Means 
Test 
Measure of Means Used to Evaluate Impact 
 
AIME  Deciles 
 
Wealth  Deciles 
 
Pension Wealth  
Deciles 
 
Adjusted by Top Quarter of 
AIME 
 
8.61 (14.84-
6.23) 
 
7.86 (11.52-
3.66) 
 
7.15 (12.51-
5.36) 
 
Adjusted by Top Quarter of 
Wealth 
 
5.70 (11.93-
6.23) 
 
7.35 (11.01-
3.66) 
 
6.02 (11.38-
5.36) 
 
Adjusted by Top Quarter of 
Pension Wealth 
 
5.40 (11.63-
6.23) 
 
6.83 (10.49-
3.66) 
 
7.23 (12.59-
5.36) 
 
 Further insight into the interactions between redistribution and type of means test 
can be found in Appendix Tables 6, 7, and 8. In those tables the effects of means tests are 
reported by decile for households ranked by AIME, total wealth, and pension wealth. We 
also report the reduction in benefits compared to the baseline experienced by members of 
each decile group. For example, households falling within the highest decile ranked by 
AIME have their benefits reduced by 20 percent due to redistribution under the current 
system. With the addition of the means test, the benefits received by those in the top 
AIME decile would be reduced by 35 percent, or an additional 15 percent.  
There are two issues related to robustness of the findings. While we have 
investigated the effects of basing the means test on AIME, total wealth, and pensions 
wealth, we also would like to know whether the results are very different when a means 
test is based on average, indexed, W2 earnings. Only 655 households are available for 
this analysis.19
19 Reliable W2 data are only available for respondents with matched records beginning in 1982, with W2 
observation available to us at the latest in 2007. As a result of the availability of W2 earnings over the 
limited time span, members of each of these households who were ages 51 to 56 in 2004 have W2 earnings 
reported only from ages 34 through 50. This rules out households with an older or younger spouse. 
 To save space, we do not go through a full range of comparisons, by type 
of means test, by basis for measuring redistribution, by sample. We simply note that 
when households are ranked by W2 earnings, in the baseline, 5.90 percent of benefits are 
redistributed. Adding a means test based on W2 earnings would reduce the benefits of 
those in the top three W2 earnings deciles by an amount equal to 14.51 percent of total 
benefits paid in baseline. See Appendix Table 9 for additional results based on W2 
earnings. 
                                                 
Security benefits among couple households is more difficult to analyze than is 
redistribution among single person households.  Thus it is useful to know that findings 
are similar when they are restricted to couple households to those we found using the full 
sample. It is also useful to know that the correspondence in results between single and 
couple households is not because the couple households totally dominate the sample. Out 
of a total sample of 2,439 households, 1,472 of the households are married couples, while 
967 are single member households.  
VI. Differences Among Households Affected by Different Means Tests 
In Table 11, we distinguish households according to which of the means tests, and 
how many of the means tests, affect them. In our sample from the Early Boomer cohort, 
437 households would be affected by only one means test, 287 by two means tests, and 
273 by three means tests.  
The way we have structured the means test, the benefit reduction facing a 
particular family is independent of the criteria used to rank families. Once they fall in the 
top quarter based on lifetime income, wealth, or pension wealth, they are subject to the 
same penalty. But households that are judged to have high means based on the same 
criterion will be subject to different reductions in their Social Security benefits depending 
on the earnings history of the husband and wife. For example, when two households have 
the same level of wealth, they may nevertheless be subject to different reductions in their 
Social Security benefits.  
We also see from Table 11 that households that are judged to have high means 
based on different criteria are often very dissimilar. Among those affected by only one 
means test, from column 2, row 2, those affected by a means test based on AIME have 
 
the highest benefits under current law with Social Security wealth of $396,000. They 
would lose $87,000 to the means test, or 22 percent of their current benefits. Those 
affected by only a means test based on total wealth are entitled to $315,000 in benefits 
(column 2, row 3). They would lose $65,000 in benefits, or 21 percent of their current 
benefits. Those subject to a means test based on pensions but not on other criteria 
(column 2, row 4) have $223,000 in current benefits. They would lose 28 percent of their 
total benefits. 
Moving down the rows, consider households affected by two means tests. Again 
there are wide differences among the benefits of the households affected by the different 
types of means tests. Those affected by a means test based AIME and a means test based 
on total wealth (column 2, row 6) have the highest benefits, averaging $453,000 in Social 
Security wealth. They would lose 15 percent of their benefits to a means test. Those who 
would be subject to means tests based on AIME and pensions have lower Social Security 
benefits, $372,000, but would lose 28 percent of their benefits to means tests. Those who 
would have their benefits reduced by means tests based on wealth and pension value, but 
not AIME, have the lowest Social Security wealth at $289,000. Their benefits would be 
reduced by 21 percent. 
The households that would be subject to a means test whether the criteria was 
AIME, total wealth, or pension wealth, have Social Security wealth averaging $448,000. 
A means test would reduce the present value of their Social Security benefits by 18 
percent. 
The importance of selecting the appropriate basis for a means test can be seen by 
scanning down the last three columns of Table 11. For example, consider column 6. If 
 
one believes that wealth is the appropriate criterion for a means test, households in rows 
2, 6, 8, and 9 would be subject to a means test. But if AIME were chosen as the basis for 
the test, the included households from rows 2 and 7 would have much lower wealth 
($609,000 and $721,000) than households that would be selected based on a total wealth 
criterion (e.g., column 6, rows 3, 6, 8, and 10).  
 
 
Table 11: Number of Households and Their Benefits and Taxes by Three Means Tests Criteria  
 
 
Number of 
households 
 
Benefits under 
current law 
in $1000 
Benefits after 
means test in 
$1000 
Ratio of 
benefits after 
means 
test/benefits 
before  
 
AIME in  
$1000 
 
Wealth in 
$1000 
 
Pension 
Wealth in 
$1000 
Only one 
adjustment 
 
437 
      
 
      AIME only 
 
174 
 
396 
 
309 
 
0.78 
 
91 
 
609 
 
69 
 
      Wealth only 
 
107 
 
315 
 
250 
 
0.79 
 
51 
 
1,509 
 
44 
 
Pension 
Wealth only 
 
156 
 
223 
 
161 
 
0.72 
 
47 
 
593 
 
285 
 
Two adjustments 
 
287 
      
 
AIME and Wealth 
 
106 
 
453 
 
383 
 
0.85 
 
103 
 
1,479 
 
80 
 
AIME & Pension 
 
57 
 
372 
 
269 
 
0.72 
 
92 
 
721 
 
272 
 
Wealth & Pension 
 
124 
 
289 
 
229 
 
0.79 
 
56 
 
1,353 
 
588 
 
Three 
adjustments 
 
273 
      
AIME, Wealth & 
Pension 
 
273 
 
448 
 
369 
 
0.82 
 
110 
 
1,577 
 
564 
The sample size is 997. It includes only households whose benefits are adjusted by one, two, or/and three means tests criteria. 
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VII. Conclusions 
Deciding on a basis for means testing would be easy if households with high lifetime 
covered earnings also had high total wealth and high pension wealth. But as we have seen, that is 
not the case for many households. As a result, different households are affected as the basis for 
the means test is changed. It will make a great deal of difference, at least to some households, 
which definition of means is chosen.  
Which measure of means is chosen will also make a great deal of difference to policy 
makers holding specific views as to how best to define means.20
20 See Samwick (2012) and Samwick and Zhou (2014) for related discussions in the context of means testing health 
benefits and financial aid for college education. 
 We have shown, for example, 
that if a policy maker believes that wealth is the appropriate basis for a means test, but another 
basis for means testing is in fact selected, households that are held by the policy maker to have 
low means will nevertheless suffer a reduction of benefits. At the heart of the problem are the 
imperfect correlations among total wealth, covered earnings and pension wealth.    
There also is some question about internal consistency of the effects of means test even 
when a single criterion is used. Households falling in the top quarter when ranked by a particular 
criteria, whether it is lifetime covered earnings, wealth or pension wealth, will not have their 
benefits reduced by the same amount. Within a top quarter group, the decrease in the present 
value of benefits is going to depend on the covered earnings of each spouse, that is, on the mix 
between own and spouse or survivor benefits within the household. It is not clear that the 
differences in realized penalties will accord with the sense of a proper basis for means testing 
among those who advocate expanding means tests. 
Our hope is that policy makers will be aware of the differences that alternative 
approaches to means testing may make, giving them a better understanding of the strengths and 
Our hope is that policymakers will be aware of the differences that alternative 
approaches to means testing may make, giving them a better understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of alternative definitions of means. The ultimate choice of 
policy, as always, depends on the preferences of the policymaker. But it is important that 
the complexities associated with the different choices are fully understood. 
Implementing these means tests would require the Social Security Administration 
to collect more data than is currently available. Husbands and wives are linked in Social 
Security data only when they reach retirement age, and the linkages are maintained only 
when spouse or survivor benefits are paid. The extensive measures in the analysis, and in 
particular measures of wealth including pensions, would be administratively costly and 
require extensive data new collection on applicants. The SSI program requires this type 
of information of applicants and processing costs are much higher. Nevertheless, for 
reasons we have discussed, there are good reasons for basing means test at the household 
rather than at the individual level. Moreover, basing means tests on the covered earnings 
uses much too restrictive a measure of means. Clearly then, if what many policymakers 
consider to be a fair means test is to be implemented, one cost will be a very expensive 
and burdensome collection of new data by SSA. That cost should clearly be recognized.  
In concluding, it is worth repeating a caveat with regard to disincentives created 
by each approach. This paper does not consider the incentive effects of means tests. As 
we noted at the outset, using current income as a basis for redistribution would 
discourage the population from delaying retirement even though that has been the goal of 
policies adopted in recent decades. Basing a means test on potential income assuming a 
full-time commitment to the labor market is the most difficult to implement on practical 
 
and legal grounds. The other approaches examined here all create disincentives of one 
type or another – reducing incentive to work, save, choose a pension, or affecting 
particular choice of assets to hold. These disincentives will play a major role in shaping 
the benefits and costs of any proposal to means test Social Security. 
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Appendix: Descriptive Data 
 
 
Appendix Table 1: The Distribution of Total Wealth Deciles by AIME Deciles for Early Boomer HRS Households 
Deciles Wealth 
Decile 1 
Wealth 
Decile 2 
Wealth 
Decile 3 
Wealth 
Decile 4 
Wealth 
Decile 5 
Wealth 
Decile 6 
Wealth 
Decile 7 
Wealth 
Decile 8 
Wealth 
Decile 9 
Wealth 
Decile 
10 
Total 
AIME 
Decile 1 
222 28 15 7 4 4 5 1 2 0 288 
AIME 
Decile 2 
47 120 47 15 12 5 5 8 2 2 263 
AIME 
Decile 3 
10 78 77 46 22 10 4 8 3 2 260 
AIME 
Decile 4 
1 26 72 56 34 14 18 10 11 6 248 
AIME 
Decile 5 
2 4 20 67 76 32 18 19 13 4 255 
AIME 
Decile 6 
0 2 17 39 40 42 30 26 20 27 243 
AIME 
Decile 7 
0 0 2 15 39 51 44 36 28 21 236 
AIME 
Decile 8 
0 0 0 6 20 50 47 38 36 28 225 
AIME 
Decile 9 
0 0 0 3 10 20 41 37 56 48 215 
AIME 
Decile 
10 
0 0 0 0 3 10 19 48 60 66 206 
Total 282 258 250 254 260 238 231 231 231 204 2439 
The sum of diagonal elements = 797. The correlation factor = 0.795. 
 
Appendix Table 2: The Distribution of Wealth Deciles by Pension Wealth Deciles for Early Boomer HRS Households 
Deciles Wealth 
Decile 1 
Wealth 
Decile 2 
Wealth 
Decile 3 
Wealth 
Decile 4 
Wealth 
Decile 5 
Wealth 
Decile 6 
Wealth 
Decile 7 
Wealth 
Decile 8 
Wealth 
Decile 9 
Wealth 
Decile 
10 
Total 
Pension 
Deciles 
1 - 3 
250 184 120 90 60 37 23 18 15 22 819 
Pension 
Decile 4 
24 35 34 44 29 19 10 13 4 7 219 
Pension 
Decile 5 
7 25 55 39 37 26 21 15 9 8 242 
Pension 
Decile 6 
1 11 25 33 46 49 34 18 15 9 241 
Pension 
Decile 7 
0 3 12 30 42 40 43 26 19 16 231 
Pension 
Decile 8 
0 0 4 14 36 38 49 54 25 17 237 
Pension 
Decile 9 
0 0 0 4 10 27 40 63 66 28 238 
Pension 
Decile 
10 
0 0 0 0 0 2 11 24 78 97 212 
Total 282 258 250 254 260 238 231 231 231 204 2439 
The sum of diagonal elements = 640. The correlation factor = 0.701. 
 
Appendix Table 3: The Distribution of Pension Wealth Deciles by AIME Deciles for Early Boomer HRS Households 
Deciles AIME 
Decile 1 
AIME 
Decile 2 
AIME 
Decile 3 
AIME 
Decile 4 
AIME 
Decile 5 
AIME 
Decile 6 
AIME 
Decile 7 
AIME 
Decile 8 
AIME 
Decile 9 
AIME 
Decile 
10 
Total 
Pension 
Deciles 
1-3 
234 191 131 89 59 45 29 22 14 5 819 
Pension 
Decile 4 
21 23 37 35 35 29 16 12 6 5 219 
Pension 
Decile 5 
9 17 42 40 40 30 22 24 10 8 242 
Pension 
Decile 6 
5 8 16 29 35 37 39 35 29 8 241 
Pension 
Decile 7 
5 9 16 12 30 26 34 37 32 30 231 
Pension 
Decile 8 
5 2 9 26 30 25 34 34 37 35 237 
Pension 
Decile 9 
7 7 5 8 19 34 32 36 45 45 238 
Pension 
Decile 
10 
2 6 4 9 7 17 30 25 42 70 212 
Total 288 263 260 248 255 243 236 225 231 206 2439 
The sum of diagonal elements = 529. The correlation factor = 0.631. 
 
Appendix Table 4: The Distribution of Wealth Deciles by W2 Earnings Deciles for Selected Early Boomer HRS Households 
Deciles Wealth 
Decile 1 
Wealth 
Decile 2 
Wealth 
Decile 3 
Wealth 
Decile 4 
Wealth 
Decile 5 
Wealth 
Decile 6 
Wealth 
Decile 7 
Wealth 
Decile 8 
Wealth 
Decile 9 
Wealth 
Decile 
10 
Total 
W2 
Decile 1 
51 7 3 7 1 0 2 1 1 0 73 
W2 
Decile 2 
20 30 8 6 3 2 0 1 2 0 72 
W2 
Decile 3 
3 19 25 10 5 1 1 0 2 3 69 
W2 
Decile 4 
0 11 15 16 9 5 3 3 1 0 63 
W2 
Decile 5 
0 3 7 17 14 13 8 2 1 0 65 
W2 
Decile 6 
0 1 3 11 17 11 12 7 8 4 74 
W2 
Decile 7 
0 0 3 2 7 20 14 8 4 5 61 
W2 
Decile 8 
0 0 1 1 8 10 15 14 10 6 64 
W2 
Decile 9 
0 0 0 1 1 5 6 21 11 10 55 
W2 
Decile 
10 
0 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 23 27 59 
Total 74 71 62 71 65 68 65 61 63 55 655 
The sum of diagonal elements = 213. The correlation factor = 0.812. 
 
Appendix Table 5: The Distribution of AIME Deciles by W2 Earnings Deciles for Selected Early Boomer HRS Households 
Deciles AIME 
Decile 1 
AIME 
Decile 2 
AIME 
Decile 3 
AIME 
Decile 4 
AIME 
Decile 5 
AIME 
Decile 6 
AIME 
Decile 7 
AIME 
Decile 8 
AIME 
Decile 9 
AIME 
Decile 
10 
Total 
W2 
Decile 1 
52 16 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 73 
W2 
Decile 2 
21 37 11 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 72 
W2 
Decile 3 
0 22 29 12 2 2 0 2 0 0 69 
W2 
Decile 4 
0 1 19 29 10 3 1 0 0 0 63 
W2 
Decile 5 
0 0 0 23 27 8 1 2 1 0 65 
W2 
Decile 6 
0 0 0 4 20 36 12 2 0 0 74 
W2 
Decile 7 
0 0 0 2 2 17 28 13 0 1 61 
W2 
Decile 8 
0 0 0 0 0 2 20 23 17 2 64 
W2 
Decile 9 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 15 29 8 55 
W2 
Decile 10 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 48 59 
Total 73 76 64 72 63 68 65 61 58 55 655 
The sum of diagonal elements = 338. The correlation factor = 0.948. 
 
Appendix Table 6: Measures of Distributions of Family Social Security Benefits and Taxes Based on AIME for Alternative Means Tests  
 A. Baseline-  Annualized Family AIME deciles: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
0-10 K 10-19 19-30 30-39 39-50 50-62 62-74 74-86 86-103 103+ All 
Average family lifetime taxes 
 
$26 K 77 126 179 228 286 338 402 459 604 272 
Average family lifetime benefits 
 
34 111 162 196 262 296 345 388 410 476 268 
% by which benefits are changed by 
redistribution 
39% 46 30 11 17 5 4 -2 -9 -20 - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
decile 
0.38% 1.30 1.40 0.72 1.44 0.54 0.45 -0.30 -1.56 -4.37 6.23 
 B. Annualized Family AIME Deciles with Means Test Based on AIME: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
Average family lifetime benefits 
 
36 111 162 196 262 296 345 320 335 387 245 
% by which benefits are changed by 
redistribution & paying off deficit 
 39% 46 30 11 17 5 4 -19 -26 -35 - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
decile & paying off deficit 
0.38% 1.30 1.40 0.72 1.44 0.54 0.45 -2.79 -4.37 -7.68 -14.84 
 C. Annualized Family AIME Deciles with Means Test Based on Total Wealth: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
Average family lifetime benefits 
 
36 109 159 190 255 277 323 361 367 406 248 
% by which benefits are changed by 
redistribution & paying off deficit 
 39% 44 28 8 14 -1 -3 -9 -19 -32 - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
decile & paying off deficit 
0.38% 1.23 1.30 0.52 1.17 -0.15 -0.36 -1.27 -3.18 -6.97 -11.93 
 D. Annualized Family AIME Deciles with Means Test Based on Pension Wealth: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
Average family lifetime benefits 
 
36 109 159 188 252 275 321 361 372 414 249 
% by which benefits are changed by 
redistribution & paying off deficit 
 39% 43 28 7 13 -2 -3 -9 -18 -30 - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
decile & paying off deficit 
0.37% 1.22 1.31 0.43 1.06 -0.23 -0.42 -1.30 -2.98 -6.70 -11.63 
*Age eligible families in 2004 include all families with at least one member being 51 to 56 years of age in 2004. Households with at least one member identified 
as a non-covered employee are excluded. Households with top and bottom 1% of wealth are excluded. 
** We define the amount of benefits redistributed to members of each decile as the difference between (1) the benefits currently paid to members of the indicated 
decile, and (2) the benefits that would be paid to members of that decile if their benefits represented the same proportion of the taxes they paid over their worklife 
as found for the average individual (or household) in the sample. 
 
Appendix Table 7: Measures of Distributions of Family Social Security Benefits and Taxes Based on Total Wealth for Alternative Means Tests 
 A. Base line-  Family Wealth deciles: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
0-95 K 95-171 171-252 252-355 355-493 493-630 630-796 796-
1078 
1078-
1510 
1510+ All 
Average family lifetime taxes 
 
$36 K 99 145 208 256 325 352 394 437 474 272 
Average family lifetime benefits 
 
40 118 170 224 273 323 347 383 389 414 268 
% by which benefits are changed by 
redistribution 
13% 21 20 9 9 1 0 -1 -10 -11 - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
decile 
0.17% 0.78 1.04 0.71 0.80 0.12 0.03 -0.17 -1.52 -1.97 3.66 
 B. Family Wealth Deciles with Means Test Based on AIME: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
Average family lifetime benefits 
 
40 118 170 218 261 294 308 340 338 360 245 
% by which benefits are changed by 
redistribution & paying off deficit 
 13% 21 20 9 6 -4 -8 -12 -21 -22 - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
decile & paying off deficit 
0.16% 0.78 1.04 0.64 0.37 -0.97 -1.41 -1.77 -3.41 -3.96 -11.52 
 C. Family Wealth Deciles with Means Test Based on Total Wealth: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
Average family lifetime benefits 
 
40 118 170 224 273 323 347 327 327 342 248 
% by which benefits are changed by 
redistribution & paying off deficit 
 13% 21 20 9 9 1 0.2 -16 -26 -27 - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
decile & paying off deficit 
0.17% 0.78 1.04 0.71 0.80 0.12 0.03 -2.25 -4.12 -4.64 -11.01 
 D. Family Wealth Deciles with Means Test Based on Pension Wealth: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
 0-95 K 95-171 171-252 252-355 355-493 493-630 630-796 796-
1078 
1078-
1510 
1510+ All 
Average family lifetime benefits 
 
40 118 170 222 268 306 317 342 339 363 249 
% by which benefits are changed by 
redistribution & paying off deficit 
 13% 21 20 9 6 -4 -8 -12 -21 -22 - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
decile & paying off deficit 
0.16% 0.78 1.04 0.66 0.60 -0.53 -1.07 -1.71 -3.35 -3.83 -10.49 
*Age eligible families in 2004 include all families with at least one member being 51 to 56 years of age in 2004. Households with at least one member being 
identified as a non-covered employee are excluded. Households with top and bottom 1% of wealth are excluded. 
** We define the amount of benefits redistributed to members of each decile as the difference between (1) the benefits currently paid to members of the indicated 
decile, and (2) the benefits that would be paid to members of that decile if their benefits represented the same proportion of the taxes they paid over their worklife 
as found for the average individual (or household) in the sample. 
 
Appendix Table 8: Measures of Distributions of Family Social Security Benefits and Taxes Based on Pension Wealth for 
Alternative Means Tests 
 A. Base line-  Family Pension Wealth deciles: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
0 0 0 0-12 12-38 38-80 80-145 145-250 250-450 450+ All 
Average family lifetime taxes 0 0 139 206 242 311 354 350 391 464 272 
Average family lifetime benefits  0 166 233 257 312 331 326 349 383 268 
% by which benefits are changed by 
redistribution 
 0 21 15 8 2 -5 -5 -9 -16 - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
decile 
 0 3.39 0.98 0.74 0.25 -0.64 -0.69 -1.30 -2.73 5.36 
 B. Family Pension Wealth Deciles with Means Test Based on AIME: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
Average family lifetime benefits  0 162 225 244 288 292 291 304 328 245 
% by which benefits are changed by 
redistribution & paying off deficit 
 0 18 11 3 -6 -16 -15 -21 -28 - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
decile & paying off deficit 
 0 2.91 0.72 0.26 -0.65 -2.10 -1.99 -3.00 -4.77 -12.51 
 C. Family Pension Wealth Deciles with Means Test Based on Total Wealth: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
Average family lifetime benefits  0 161 225 250 300 314 301 304 313 248 
% by which benefits are changed by 
redistribution & paying off deficit 
 0 18 11 5 -2 -10 -13 -21 -31 - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
decile & paying off deficit 
 0 2.86 0.71 0.45 -0.19 -1.28 -1.62 -2.99 -5.30 -11.38 
 D. Family Pension Wealth Deciles with Means Test Based on Pension Wealth: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
Average family lifetime benefits  0 166 233 257 312 331 279 276 309 249 
% by which benefits are changed by 
redistribution & paying off deficit 
 0 21 15 8 2 -5 -19 -28 -32 - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
decile & paying off deficit 
 0 3.39 0.98 0.74 0.25 -0.64 -2.44 -4.03 -5.48 -12.59 
*Age eligible families in 2004 include all families with at least one member being 51 to 56 years of age in 2004. Households with at least one member being 
identified as a non-covered employee are excluded. Households with top and bottom 1% of wealth are excluded. 
** We define the amount of benefits redistributed to members of each decile as the difference between (1) the benefits currently paid to members of the indicated 
decile, and (2) the benefits that would be paid to members of that decile if their benefits represented the same proportion of the taxes they paid over their worklife 
as found for the average individual (or household) in the sample. 
 
Appendix Table 9: Measures of Distributions of Household Social Security Benefits and Taxes for All Age Eligible* 
Households When Ranked by W2 Deciles: Adjusted by Top Quarter of W2 Earnings;  
 A. Base line-  W2 Earnings deciles: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
0-28 K 28-123 123-239 239-311 311-407 407-543 543-671 671-841 841-
1,039 
1,039+ All 
Average family lifetime taxes 33k 64 118 150 189 234 307 354 413 571 243 
Average family lifetime benefits 36 85 139 163 189 240 296 311 346 448 225 
% by which benefits are changed by 
redistribution 
15 43 27 17 8 11 4 -5 -10 -15 - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
decile 
0.21 1.14 1.32 1.04 0.63 1.04 0.52 -0.75 -1.65 -3.50 5.90 
 B. W2 Earnings Adjusted by Top W2 Earnings: 2004 (2004 dollars) 
Average family lifetime benefits 36 85 139 163 189 240 296 255 279 376 206 
% by which benefits are changed by 
redistribution & paying off deficit 
15 43 27 17 8 11 4 -22 -27 -29 - 
Share of total benefits redistributed to 
decile & paying off deficit 
0.21 1.14 1.32 1.04 0.63 1.04 0.52 -3.21 -4.64 -6.66 -14.51 
  
*Age eligible families in 2004 include all families with at least one member being 51 to 56 years of age in 2004. Households with at least one member being 
identified as a non-covered employee are excluded. Households with top and bottom 1% of wealth are excluded. 
** We define the amount of benefits redistributed to members of each decile as the difference between (1) the benefits currently paid to members of the indicated 
decile, and (2) the benefits that would be paid to members of that decile if their benefits represented the same proportion of the taxes they paid over their worklife 
as found for the average individual (or household) in the sample. 
 
